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Abstract
It remains unknown to what extent the human visual system interprets information about com-
plex scenes without conscious analysis. Here we used visual masking techniques to assess
whether illusory contours (Kanizsa shapes) are perceived when the inducing context creating
this illusion does not reach awareness. In the first experiment we tested perception directly by
having participants discriminate the orientation of an illusory contour. In the second experi-
ment, we exploited the fact that the presence of an illusory contour enhances performance on
a spatial localization task. Moreover, in the latter experiment we also used a different masking
method to rule out the effect of stimulus duration. Our results suggest that participants do not
perceive illusory contours when they are unaware of the inducing context. This is consistent
with theories of a multistage, recurrent process of perceptual integration. Our findings thus
challenge some reports, including those from neurophysiological experiments in anaesthe-
tized animals. Furthermore, we discuss the importance to test the presence of the phenome-
nal percept directly with appropriate methods.
Introduction
What role does conscious processing of the environment fulfill and how much processing
occurs in the absence of awareness? It is self-evident that much of the internal bodily functions
and the learned motor behaviors, such as walking or driving, operate mostly without aware-
ness. But for processing through the classical senses, like vision, there have been widely discrep-
ant findings on how much stimulus processing can occur and how it affects decision-making
when the subject is unaware of the stimulus. Moreover, the approach to be used when studying
unconscious stimulus processing has also been subject of controversy [1].
Several experiments suggest that the effect of contextual stimuli within a target, such as the
percept of visual illusions or adaptation effects, persists even when participants are unaware of
the presented contextual information [2–6]. The use of continuous flash suppression (CFS), in
which a dynamic, high-contrast stimulus is presented to one eye to suppress the stimulus in the
other eye from awareness, has become a popular way to probe unconscious stimulus processing
[7]. Using this procedure it has been claimed that the perception of physical facial attributes
[8], the complex analysis of naturalistic scenes [9], and even linguistic processing and
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arithmetic can be performed without awareness [10]. However, several of these findings have
recently failed to be replicated and were challenged on theoretical grounds [11–13].
Neuroimaging experiments showed that while both simple and more complex stimuli have a
neural signature in the visual cortex under masking conditions [14–16], the encoding of uncon-
scious stimuli appears to be qualitatively different. Not only is the overall response to uncon-
scious visual stimuli weaker [15] but coupling between different stages in the visual processing
hierarchy is also reduced [17] and the information content differs [16,18,19]. In particular, the
response to these stimuli is more variable [20], and also localized in more posterior regions than
to conscious stimuli [18]. One reason for this variability could be that only simple positional or
geometric information is processed in the absence of awareness, but that more complex abstrac-
tion and perceptual integration requires consciousness Under this hypothesis, the neural encod-
ing of stimuli is noisy because local stimulus interactions are preserved but abstract and therefore
coherent representations are disrupted. Specifically, we used shape stimuli that were either
defined by the position or the orientation of simple image elements. We demonstrated that when
such stimuli were rendered invisible using fast counter-phase flicker (at 120Hz) they could speed
up performance on a shape discrimination task of conscious stimuli [21]. Critically, this priming
effect was only present for stimuli sharing the same positions, or–if oriented elements were used
for priming–the positions along the path implied by the elements. We observed no priming by
invisible primes if the test stimulus was smaller than the prime stimulus. This suggests that invisi-
ble priming operated locally, possibly in retinotopic space in early visual cortex, but no abstract
integration of individual elements into the concept of a shape occurred without awareness.
We further tested whether two brightness illusions manifest when the inducing context is
rendered invisible by means of CFS [22]. We found that masking the context (a smooth gradi-
ent in luminance) had little impact on simultaneous brightness contrast of two targets that
were unmasked. In a stark dissociation, participants could not discriminate the orientation of
an illusory contour, defined by a Kanizsa triangle, when the inducing context (the ‘Pacman’
shapes whose open segments define the corners of the triangle) were masked selectively by
CFS. This could indicate that the generation of the illusory contour percept occurs at a later
stage of visual processing than simultaneous brightness contrast, either in terms of the visual
hierarchy or in the latency of processing. These findings were also consistent with previous
reports that illusory contours are not perceived when the inducers are suppressed from aware-
ness during binocular rivalry [23].
These findings challenge some previous reports, using psychophysical tests in healthy vol-
unteers [24] and even neurophysiological experiments in anesthetized animals [25] that sug-
gested that illusory contours could be formed in the absence of awareness. However, none of
these previous studies specifically tested whether the experimental participants actually per-
ceived an illusory contour. Similarly, neuropsychological studies in neglect patients [26–29]
suggested that illusory contour processing occurs when part of the inducing context is placed
in the blind hemifield. However, this also does not conclusively support the assertion that con-
tours are formed in the absence of any contextual awareness.
However, two issues burden the interpretation of previous experiments that show no evidence
of illusory contours when the inducers are masked. First, there is evidence that illusory contours are
processed by binocular neurons in early visual cortex [30–33]. It does in fact seem unsurprising
that the mechanisms inducing illusory contours at least partially overlap with those for segmenting
surfaces in depth [34]. When retinal disparity implies that inducers are at different depths from the
background, the visual system not only produces the percept of illusory contours but the surface
bounded by illusory contours is also perceived in stereoscopic depth [31]. Thus when binocular
processing is disrupted or overwhelmed by a dichoptic mask or binocular rivalry, the illusory con-
tour percept is also broken. Another recent study further complicated this situation by finding that
Kanizsa Contours and Awareness
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Kanizsa shapes broke through CFS faster than control stimuli [35]. Leaving aside conceptual issues
with the time-to-emergence paradigm, it is imperative that the dependence of illusory contours on
awareness must be confirmed using masking methods other than CFS.
A second confound with these previous studies [22,23] is that even if participants perceived
an illusory contour, this percept was far less salient than real luminance contours, as it may
have been obscured by the dominant masking stimulus. The addition of a simple control con-
dition could remedy this problem: One experimental stimulus should be a real contour defined
by a subtle luminance contrast that mimics the illusory contour percept as closely as possible.
If participants can detect and discriminate this stimulus but are unable to do so for the illusory
contour condition, this indicates that the illusory percept is indeed disrupted specifically, rather
than the more general ability to detect subtle stimuli.
In the present paper, we carried out two experiments to address these confounds and answer
the question of whether Kanizsa contours are formed when inducers are not consciously per-
ceived. In experiment 1, we used a similar design as in our previous study [22]. Here, partici-
pants were asked to discriminate the orientation of a Kanizsa triangle. However, instead of CFS
we employed a temporal masking method to render the inducers invisible. Moreover, we
included a control condition in which a real, luminance-defined contour was present. Because
this masking method relies on very brief stimulus durations, in experiment 2 we presented
long (500ms) stimuli rendered invisible by means of fast counter-phase flicker [3,21]. This is
critical because the formation of illusory contours arise comparably slowly [36–38] and thus
may be disrupted by a fast temporal masking technique. In addition to this, previous research
demonstrated that the presence of illusory contours boosts participants’ ability to discriminate
the position of a tiny target [23,39], providing a specific test of whether the participant in fact
perceives an illusory contour or not. We therefore measured the ability of a group of partici-
pants, who were well trained at psychophysical tasks, to discriminate the position of a dot tar-
get for Kanizsa and control stimuli presented with or without masking.
Materials and Methods
Both experiments were carried out at the UCL Department of Experimental Psychology. Proce-
dures adhered to the Declaration of Helsinki. Ethical approval for this study was obtained from
the UCL Research Ethics Committee and all participants gave written, informed consent.
Participants in experiments 1 were recruited among the UCL student population. In experi-
ment 2 we recruited participants who were familiar with psychophysical tasks. All Participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity.
All experiments were conducted in a dark, sound-attenuated room. For the duration of the
experimental sessions, participants were asked to stabilize their head on a chin rest located at a
fixed distance of 48cm from the stimulus presentation screen where stimuli were presented to
them binocularly.
Stimuli were generated by a computer and presented on a 22-inch Samsung SM2233RZ
LCDmonitor at a resolution of 1680 x 1050 pixels. Screen refresh rate in experiment 1 was set
to 60Hz. In experiment 2 it was set to 120Hz. The experiment was controlled and behavioral
responses were recorded using MATLAB (The Mathworks, Inc.) and Psychtoolbox 3 [40]
using a standard keyboard.
Experiment 1
The experiment comprised two tasks: the first, henceforth called ‘Kanizsa’ task, investigated
whether participants can perceive illusory contours without awareness of their inducers. The
second task, the ‘Visibility’ task, assessed the effectiveness of the masking technique directly.
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Study Design
Like our earlier experiment using continuous flash suppression, this experiment aimed to mea-
sure the perception of illusory contours in a direct manner. We implemented a 2x3 design with
visibility (invisible, visible) and type of stimulus (real, illusory, control) as within subject
factors.
Every participant completed two different tasks. Each task comprised 25 blocks of trials,
where one block consisted of 24 trials in the Kanizsa task and 8 trials in the visibility task.
Across one task, each condition appeared 100 times. The visibility task only comprised the visi-
ble and invisible control conditions.
Participants made behavioral responses in a forced-choice design by button press (left or
right arrow) on a standard computer keyboard. Each trial required either a left or a right
response and each response type appeared twice per block for each condition. Conditions were
selected pseudo-randomly for every trial but were counterbalanced over each block.
Participants
Seventeen (13 female; age range: 18–29, mean age: 23.8±2.5) normal, healthy participants took
part in the experiment. An additional two participants were tested but they failed to discrimi-
nate the real luminance contour under masking conditions and were therefore excluded from
further analysis (see more details below). All participants were unaware of the experimental
hypothesis.
Stimuli
Stimuli were created by placing four discs (inducer elements, diameter = 2.2°) in the configura-
tion of a square (width = 4.3°). The configuration of these discs was centered on fixation. As
both standard edge type and a number of line-end inducing elements have comparable efficacy
in the clarity with which illusory contours are perceived by participants [41,42], here the discs
were defined by partial concentric circles. Each of the four lines forming the circles had a width
of approximately 0.07° with a luminance of 0.6 cd/m2. The positioning of the gap within the
circles gave rise to the percept of a Kanizsa triangle (Fig 1A). Thus, a number of line-end induc-
ing elements gave rise to perception of illusory contours [43].
We also included a real luminance condition. Here, the stimuli did not contain any discs
but instead there was a triangle defined by a real but subtle luminance contrast at the exact
location where the Kanizsa triangle would be perceived in the illusory condition (Fig 1B). We
reasoned that if participants were unable to discriminate the orientation of this subtle lumi-
nance edge when the inducers were masked, this implied that they would be unable to detect
any illusory contour that could have formed without awareness of the inducers. Therefore, we
removed two participants whose discrimination performance for this condition was at chance
levels from any further analyses.
Control stimuli did not form any triangle and were created by altering the orientations of
the inducers by a systematic rotation of 180° (Fig 1C). This condition was somewhat unneces-
sary because the dependent variable, accuracy for discriminating the orientation of the triangle,
was orthogonal to the condition and for these control stimuli there was no strictly correct
answer in this discrimination task. The “correct” responses in this condition were dummy
coded so that the stimulus-response mapping matched that for the equivalent illusory triangle
stimuli before rotating the inducers. We included this condition as catch trials–participants
should be guessing here because there was no triangle to discriminate. Thus it provided infor-
mation on whether participants could indeed perceive the triangle contours or whether they
adopted a strategy of matching the inducer orientation to feedback.
Kanizsa Contours and Awareness
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The background had a luminance of 76.6 cd/m2 and real triangles were defined by a subtly
greater luminance of 86.9 cd/m2. The mask was only used in the invisible conditions and was
designed as a square configuration of four black discs (0.6 cd/m2), each containing four white
concentric circles (230 cd/m2). It was wide enough to cover all four Pacmen in the illusory and
control conditions (Fig 1D). The masking technique consisted of a sequence of three frames
which was repeated three consecutive times: At first the mask appeared on the screen, followed
by the appearance of the stimulus and a final blank screen. In the visible conditions, a blank
grey screen replaced the mask frame.
Procedure Kanizsa task. At first, participants were instructed that they would see a trian-
gle appear on the screen. They were asked to judge whether its hypotenuse was tilted clockwise
or counter-clockwise from vertical by pressing the corresponding response key. We explained
this task to them as a decision whether the right angle of the triangle was pointing to the left or
to the right but they were told explicitly to judge the contours of the triangle, in particular the
long hypotenuse extending through the center of the stimulus display. Because we wished to
Fig 1. Illustration of the stimuli. A) (i) Kanizsa triangle pointing right (ii) Kanizsa triangle pointing left. B) (i)
Real triangle pointing right (ii) Real triangle pointing left. C) Control stimuli were created by a systematic 180°
rotation of the individual Pacmen. D) Illustration of the masking procedure in the invisible conditions: A mask-
stimulus-blank screen frame sequence was repeated three times. In the visible conditions a blank screen
replaced the mask.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0161177.g001
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keep the contrast between real triangle and the background as low as possible, we trained par-
ticipants on the visible and invisible real triangle condition until they were able to detect them
correctly.
Participants were instructed to fixate a small black dot (0.2° wide) that was present in the
center of the screen throughout the experiment. On each trial, the fixation dot was displayed
alone for 500ms. This was followed by a sequence of three frames that defined whether the con-
dition was a visible or an invisible one. In the invisible condition a 300ms mask followed the
fixation period. Subsequently, the stimulus appeared on the screen for one frame of approx.
16.7 milliseconds (ms), immediately followed by a blank screen that was shown for one frame
as well. This mask-stimulus-blank sequence was repeated three times before a second and final
post-stimulus blank screen was presented until participants gave their response. Fig 2A shows
the general paradigm for the experimental procedure.
Procedure Visibility task. We further tested whether participants indeed did not con-
sciously perceive any contextual information of the stimuli in the invisible condition. For this
purpose, the visibility task assessed the effectiveness of the masking technique by measuring
whether participants could consciously discriminate the inducer elements. Participants were
Fig 2. Illustration of the trial sequence in experiment 1. A) Kanizsa task: Each trial was composed of five
frames: fixation dot, mask, stimulus, blank, and post-stimulus blank. After the participant’s response, the
fixation point provided feedback for 100ms (green: correct; red: incorrect). The duration of each frame is
shown on the time-line. Note that in the visible conditions, a blank screen replaced the mask. B) Visibility task:
Trials proceeded in the same way as in the Kanizsa task except that only control stimuli were being shown
and participants judged whether the right-angle gap was in the bottom left or right inducer (indicated by the
green circle, which was not present in the actual stimuli).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0161177.g002
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asked to judge whether a right angle was presented in the left or right bottom inducer. The tim-
ing of the trial sequence in this task was identical to the Kanizsa task, with one exception: only
control stimuli were used (Fig 2B).
Data analysis. Performance in both tasks was defined in terms of mean proportion of
accurate responses in each condition. Initially, we conducted binomial tests at the individual
level to quantify how many participants performed significantly above chance. A condition for
any participant’s data to be considered in the group analysis of this experiment was that their
performance to the invisible real stimulus condition was significantly above chance (0.5). This
is because the features necessary to distinguish the contours of the real triangle were not
masked and if a participant could not perform the task for this particular stimulus, any test of
the perception of illusory contours would be redundant.
One-sample t-tests were carried out at the group level for each condition individually to
assess whether the participants’ level of performance was significantly above chance (>0.5). In
addition to traditional frequentist statistical tests, we also quantified the evidence for or against
the hypothesis that participants could discriminate the stimuli by calculating a Bayes Factor
using a default Cauchy prior with scaling factor 0.707 for the alternative hypothesis [44]. For
conditions with performance near chance levels, this enabled us to also quantify how strongly
the evidence supported the null hypothesis that participants were actually guessing.
Experiment 2
This experiment only comprised one task that tested the percept of illusory contours by mea-
suring participants’ threshold on a spatial localization task. Such a manipulation has been used
successfully in previous experiments [23,39]. While it is an indirect test, the contour aids per-
formance on the spatial localization task. This provides independent evidence about whether
participants perceived any illusory contours and therefore helps to address confounds with
measuring the percept directly as we did in experiment 1. Pilot experiments using a task in
which we directly measured the illusory percept (the same task as experiment 1 but with the
long-lasting masking technique employed in experiment 2) could encourage participants to
pay close attention to the masked context and thus reduce the effectiveness of the masking pro-
cedure. This would mean that participants use residual awareness of the inducers to perform
the task instead of actually making a perceptual judgment of the illusory contour.
Moreover, because the masking procedure in experiment 1 used very brief presentations of
the invisible Kanizsa stimuli (16.7ms) while these were much longer (300ms) for the visible
ones, in experiment 2 we used a different masking procedure: stimuli were defined by sinusoi-
dal gratings which reversed contrast polarity at 120Hz. This method can effectively render sti-
muli invisible for prolonged periods so that participants only perceive a grey screen. Previous
research suggests that stimuli masked in this way are processed in early visual cortex [3]. More-
over, we showed that stimuli rendered invisible by this method could induce local priming
effects on a shape discrimination task [21].
Participants. Five normal, healthy participants (3 female; age range: 24–37; mean age:
30.2) completed this experiment, including one of the authors (DSS). All participants were
experienced with psychophysical experiments. While the results from a larger subject base
might generalize more to a broad population, we reasoned that only precise measurements of
participants’ visual performance would afford interpretable data. Unlike in the first experi-
ment, in experiment 2 we measured how position discrimination thresholds changed between
experimental conditions. Naïve, untrained participants from the general population would be
more likely to contribute noisy data and this might obscure potential subtle perception of illu-
sory contours in the masked condition.
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Stimuli. We generated a Kanizsa shape by presenting four Gabor patches (sinusoidal grat-
ings with wavelength 0.33° visual angle convolved with a Gaussian with standard deviation 0.8°
at 30% contrast) in the locations of the four corners of a square with a side-length of 8.2°. We
turned these patches into Pacmen by setting a right-angled region of each patch to zero con-
trast (uniform background grey). This stimulus thus described an illusory square (Fig 3A). In
the control conditions, the Pacmen were rotated by 180° so that the corners faced outward
breaking the illusory percept (Fig 3B). In the real luminance control, we did not present any
Gabor patches but instead a square region with a subtle luminance contrast (54 cd/m2) relative
to the background (Fig 3C). The orientation and phase of each Gabor patch was randomized in
each trial. Finally, we created a mask stimulus by overlaying 24 Gabor patches in the four loca-
tions. These patches were presented at 5% contrast and covered the full range of orientations in
equal steps of 15° but their phases were randomized. This resulted in a patchy pattern without
any obvious orientation cue (Fig 3D). The mask pattern was also generated anew in every trial.
These stimuli were presented in the center of the screen. The target stimulus was a tiny dark
grey dot (diameter: ~0.1°) which could appear somewhere along the horizontal meridian, either
near the right or the left vertical boundary of the square.
The square stimuli were either invisible or visible. In the invisible condition, the gratings
reversed contrast polarity at 120Hz. In the visible conditions and the real luminance control,
every even-numbered frame was uniform grey (except for the fixation dot).
Fig 3. Stimuli (A-D) and trial sequence (E) in experiment 2. During the stimulus interval either an illusory
Kanizsa square (A), a control stimulus with rotated inducers (B), or a real luminance square without any
inducers (C) was presented. In visible trials every odd-numbered video frame at 120Hz contained the
stimulus while every even-numbered frame contained only a blank screen with the blue fixation dot. In
invisible trials, both frames contained the Gabor patches for A and B but their contrast polarity alternated
between frames. For real luminance stimuli the even-numbered frames always contained a blank screen. D)
A mask stimulus preceded and followed each stimulus interval. E) Each trial started with 500ms of fixation,
followed by a 100msmask, the 500ms stimulus interval, another 100msmask, and finally a blank screen
without a fixation dot that remained until participants gave their response. Their task was to locate the small
target dot in the stimulus display and decide whether it appeared to the left or the right of the vertical boundary
of the square (here, the correct response is right).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0161177.g003
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Procedure. Fig 3E depicts the sequence of an invisible Kanizsa trial in experiment 2. Each
trial started with 500ms of a blank grey screen that only contained a black fixation dot (diame-
ter 0.26°). This was followed by a 100ms presentation of the mask and then 500ms of the stimu-
lus, after which another 100ms mask interval was presented. Then the screen turned grey and
the fixation dot was removed, indicating that participants could give their behavioral response.
During the stimulus interval the fixation dot was blue instead of black to denote that this
was the task-relevant interval. As described above, the stimuli in this interval either reversed in
contrast polarity at 120Hz (invisible Kanizsa and control conditions) or the frames were inter-
leaved with blank frames (visible Kanizsa, real luminance stimuli and control). During the
stimulus presentation the small dark target dot also appeared at some location along the hori-
zontal meridian. Its position was randomized to be either near the left or the right vertical
boundary of the square region. The dot could either appear inside or outside the square region.
The dependent variable in this experiment was the distance between the target dot and the
boundary of the square region and it was controlled by a 2-down, 1-up staircase procedure that
converged on the threshold distance in each of the five experimental conditions at which per-
formance was approximately 70.7% correct. That is, after every consecutive two correct trials
the distance would decrease by one pixel (~0.03°) while after every incorrect trial it increased
by one pixel. All five staircases started at a distance of 15 pixels (0.49°). The minimum and
maximum that they could reach were one pixel and 25 pixels (0.82°), respectively.
Before the actual experiment we showed participants static examples of the Kanizsa and the
control stimuli. Participants were instructed to judge whether the target dot was left or right of
the (imaginary) vertical boundary of the square region. While showing them still images of the
stimuli, we specifically explained to them that this boundary was defined by the exact center of
the Gabor patches (i.e. the corner of the Pacman’s mouth) and that this was identical in both
the Kanizsa and the control conditions. We further informed them that there would be a third
condition in which they should only see a subtly lighter grey square against the background but
no Gabor patches. In order to become acquainted with the task, they then performed 1–2
blocks of the experiment with only the visible Kanizsa, the control and the real luminance con-
dition. Finally, the actual experiment would commence. Participants were informed that the
task was largely always the same as the familiarization run, although during this experiment
there would be many more trials in which they either only see a light grey square but no Gabor
patches or that they might even only see a grey blank screen. Except for the author, all partici-
pants were unaware of the experimental hypothesis. In debriefing none of the participants
reported seeing any Gabor patches during the invisible condition.
Participants performed two consecutive runs comprising 500 trials each. These runs were
further subdivided into 25 blocks. In every block each of the five conditions appeared 4 times
in a pseudo-randomly interleaved order. Blocks were initiated by button-press. During block
breaks a message on the screen reminded the participant of the task instructions and of the
number of blocks they had already completed.
Data analysis. We determined the threshold distance in each of the five experimental con-
ditions by calculating the mean distance across the final 15 reversals in the staircase procedure.
Then we conducted a group level analysis in which we compared the average thresholds for
conditions across participants. For this we used a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA with
the factors visibility (visible vs invisible) and stimulus type (illusory vs control stimulus). As
there was only one condition with a real luminance contour, the thresholds for this condition
were not included in the ANOVA. However, we used paired t-tests to compare results for the
illusory and control stimuli directly to the real luminance condition.
Kanizsa Contours and Awareness
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Results
Experiment 1
In this experiment, 17 participants judged the orientation (left vs right) of a triangle that was
either defined by an illusory contour or a subtle real luminance edge. In a third control condi-
tion the Pacmen stimuli inducing illusory contours were rotated so that no triangle shape
could be perceived.
Kanizsa Task. Accuracy across participants for discriminating the orientation of the trian-
gle for the six conditions is displayed in Fig 4. We tested whether discrimination performance
in each condition was above chance at the group level.
In the visible condition, the mean proportion of correct responses for the group was close to
ceiling and clearly better than chance both for the real (M = 0.97, t(16) = 83.5, p< 0.001,
BF10>9.810
18) and the illusory condition (M = 0.99, t(16) = 120.8, p<0.0001, BF10>2.410
21).
In the control condition, however, the group performed significantly below chance level
(M = 0.30, t(16) = -3.87, p = 0.001, BF10 = 29.3). There was considerable variability in perfor-
mance for this condition ranging from 0 to 0.74.
In the invisible condition, only performance on the real triangle condition was significantly
above chance level (M = 0.71, t(16) = 6.4, p<0.001, BF10 = 2608.7). Performance on both the
illusory triangle condition (M = 0.51, t(16) = 1, p = 0.332, BF10 = 0.385) and the control condi-
tion (M = 0.50, t(16) = 0.2, p = 0.859, BF10 = 0.253) were at chance level. Importantly, perfor-
mance on the real triangle condition was also significantly greater than for either the illusory
contour (t(16) = 6.1, p<0.0001, BF10 = 1475.4) or the control condition (t(16) = 5.6, p<0.0001,
BF10 = 688). In contrast, performance for the illusory contour did not differ from the control
condition (t(16) = 0.7, p = 0.525, BF10 = 0.3).
Fig 4. Results of experiment 1. Accuracy for discriminating the orientation of a triangle stimulus in visible or
invisible (masked) trials. Each dot represents the performance of an individual participant in each of the
conditions. The large symbols and error bars denote the mean ±1 standard error for each condition. Black:
real luminance contour. Red: illusory (Kanizsa) contour. Blue: control stimuli.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0161177.g004
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Visibility Task. In a supplementary control task we asked participants to make a decision
directly based on the inducers by reporting which one of the two bottom inducers contained
the right angle. This assessed any residual perception of the inducer shapes under masking con-
ditions. In the visible condition, the mean proportion of correct responses across participants
was again close to ceiling and far above chance level (M = 0.96, t(16) = 22.2, p<0.001,
BF10>2.910
10). In contrast, participants’ mean performance in the invisible condition did not
significantly differ from chance level (M = 0.48, t(16) = -1.3, p = 0.227, BF10 = 0.489), suggest-
ing that participants could generally not perceive the inducers under masking conditions.
Note, however, that there was only anecdotal support for the null hypothesis (BF10>1/3).
The first experiment thus suggested that if participants were unaware of the inducers because
they had been masked, they were unable to judge the orientation of the Kanizsa triangle. This
supports the interpretation that illusory contours are not formed under these conditions.
Experiment 2
In experiment 2 we changed the approach in a number of ways. First, instead of the brief stimu-
lus presentations used in the first experiment we used counter-phase flicker to render stimuli
invisible for prolonged periods. Moreover, we used an indirect measure of illusory contour pro-
cessing: we took advantage of previous reports that the presence of an illusory contour stimulus
enhanced participants’ thresholds at discriminating the position of a small dot [23,39]. Here
we tested whether this also occurred when the inducers generating the illusory contour were
invisible. Because this task was more challenging than those in previous experiments, and to
rule out that our previous results might have been due to insufficient practice or familiarity
with psychophysical experiments, in this experiment we only tested a small group of well-
trained psychophysics participants.
Fig 5 plots position discrimination thresholds in the different conditions for all individual
participants and the group averages. Overall, thresholds measured while a Kanizsa stimulus
Fig 5. Results of experiment 2. Spatial discrimination thresholds per condition (real luminance vs illusory vs
control) on a dot localization task while participants were presented with visible (blue squares), invisible
(orange diamonds), or real luminance stimuli (black circles). A-E) Plots for the five individual participants. F)
Thresholds averaged across participants ±1 standard error of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0161177.g005
Kanizsa Contours and Awareness
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0161177 August 12, 2016 11 / 20
was presented were significantly lower than those measured for control stimuli (F(1,4) = 34.6,
p = 0.004). There was also a non-significant trend of lower thresholds during visible than invis-
ible trials (F(1,4) = 7.5, p = 0.052). Importantly, there was a significant interaction between visi-
bility and stimulus type (F(1,4) = 15.9, p = 0.016). In the visible condition thresholds measured
while an illusory Kanizsa contour was present were significantly lower (M = 0.08°, t(4) = -5.27,
p = 0.006, BF10 = 9.95) compared to the control condition without a contour (M = 0.21°). In con-
trast, in the invisible condition the difference in thresholds for illusory contours (M = 0.20°) was
not significantly different from that for the control stimulus (M = 0.21°, t(4) = -0.16, p = 0.882,
BF10 = 0.4).
Thresholds measured for the real luminance contour were of a similar magnitude as those
measured for the visible illusory contour (M = 0.10°, t(4) = -0.92, p = 0.409, BF10 = 0.55). In
contrast, thresholds for the real luminance contour were significantly lower than for invisible
Kanizsa stimuli (t(4) = 3.84, p = 0.019, BF10 = 4.53). Thresholds for the real luminance contour
were also significantly lower than for either control stimulus (visible: t(4) = 4.4, p = 0.012,
BF10 = 6.19; invisible: t(4) = 5.3, p = 0.006, BF10 = 9.9).
Discussion
In two psychophysical experiments we tested whether the visual system forms illusory
(Kanizsa) contours in the absence of awareness of the inducing context. Taken together, with
previous experiments using dichoptic stimulation [22,23] all the findings suggest that illusory
contours are not perceived when the inducers are masked.
In our first experiment, we directly measured illusory contour perception by asking partici-
pants to discriminate the orientation of a Kanizsa triangle. This procedure was akin to our ear-
lier experiments [22] that showed no evidence either that illusory contours are formed when
inducers are suppressed from awareness. In those experiments we employed CFS in which a
dynamic, high-contrast mask presented to one eye suppresses awareness of a stimulus viewed
by the fellow eye. Similarly, previous studies showed that illusory contours are not formed
when the inducers are suppressed from awareness during binocular rivalry [23]. However,
because previous reports indicate that illusory contours are processed by binocular neurons
[30–33] the use of dichoptic stimuli may simply disrupt their processing.
Therefore here we used normal binocular viewing conditions and a different method to ren-
der the inducers invisible. In addition, we included a real luminance contour condition as a
baseline check. This helped to rule out another trivial explanation for our earlier findings: The
presence of the bright masks could possibly have obscured the detection of the subtle illusory
boundary. Our real luminance contour was never masked because the masks only overlapped
with the corners of the triangle; therefore, if participants were able to discriminate the subtle
real luminance contour they should also be able to do so if an illusory contour were indeed
formed. We only included participants for whom discrimination of this real luminance contour
was significantly above chance levels. Nonetheless, participants were unable to discriminate the
orientation of the illusory contour when inducers were masked. The phenomenological experi-
ence of the real luminance and the illusory contour is not perfectly identical (and it obviously is
not for the visible conditions). However, the real luminance conditions were very faint while
illusory contours tend to be subjectively quite salient. Thus it seems unlikely that participants
should be able to detect only the real luminance contour but not the illusory contour.
Experiment 1 also contained control conditions in which the individual inducers had been
rotated by 180° and thus no illusory triangle should be formed. These were essentially catch tri-
als because participants should have been guessing, as there was no actual triangle to discrimi-
nate. This was clearly the case for control stimuli when inducers were invisible. However, for
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visible control stimuli discrimination performance varied widely from 0–0.74 proportion cor-
rect responses and was even significantly below chance level. The “correct” responses in this
condition were dummy coded so that the stimulus-response mapping matched that for the
equivalent illusory triangle stimuli before rotating the inducers. Therefore one inducer in the
top row had a right-angled cutout that pointed inwards (Fig 1) and this would be consistent
with the presence of a triangle oriented in the opposite direction (even though no actual trian-
gle should be perceived). Some participants may have adopted this stimulus response mapping
while others did not. It would therefore have been better to have all inducers point outwards in
this control and randomize their locations. However, our actual results serendipitously support
the fact that masking was effective in this experiment: The fact that participants performed at
chance level when the control stimuli were masked rules out that they had any residual aware-
ness of the inducers. The results of our explicit Visibility task after the main experiment also
corroborated this conclusion.
The results of experiment 1 contradict previous claims that a “ghostly triangle” could be per-
ceived when the inducers of a Kanizsa triangle were masked [24]. However, follow-up experi-
ments failed to replicate these experiments but instead suggested that conscious processing of
the inducers precedes awareness of the illusory contours and that these earlier results were in
fact due to residual awareness of the inducers [45]. Another critical issue with these experi-
ments is that the perception of illusory contours is based on a Yes or No judgment of whether a
triangle shape was present. Such a task could theoretically be performed based on any residual
awareness of the corners in the inducers. Our task required an explicit orientation discrimina-
tion of the illusory contour. If participants had been able to perform this task in spite of being
unable to perceive the inducers, this would have been more conclusive evidence that illusory
contours are indeed formed when inducers are masked.
Naturally, our design that split the main task from a test of awareness did not allow us to
measure the awareness on each actual trial of the main experiment–only a dual-task design in
which visibility is probed directly in the main experiment would permit this. However, a dual-
task design cannot classify the awareness of individual trials perfectly as the participant’s judg-
ment of their own awareness is subject to variability. Dual-tasks also entail a division of atten-
tional resources across the different task components. It could be argued that the Visibility task
was more difficult than the Kanizsa task because the former required the judgment of a small,
peripheral feature of the stimulus. This may complicate the interpretation of chance perfor-
mance on this task.
Experiment 1 also used very brief stimulus presentations and powerful, high-contrast masks
to render stimuli invisible. Rather than the absence of awareness, the reason why invisible con-
tours were not formed could be the brevity of the stimuli or because the mask fundamentally
disrupted stimulus processing. This is certainly a possibility because previous research indi-
cated that the processing of illusory contours occurs relatively slowly [36–38]. Therefore, in
our second experiment, we used counter-phase flicker to mask the inducers instead of the
masking methods employed in the earlier experiments. This allowed us to present stimuli for
prolonged periods. While this is also a temporal masking procedure, the stimulus energy is
constant during the entire presentation because only the polarity changes between frames. Fur-
thermore, we exploited the fact that the presence of an illusory contour enhances performance
on a dot localization task because it provides a visual aid for determining its spatial location
[23,39]. We confirmed this advantage when inducers were not masked and performance was
comparable to when we presented real luminance contours only. However, when inducers
were rendered invisible this advantage for illusory contours disappeared. This task may actually
be an even more appropriate test of the induction of illusory contours than testing discrimina-
tion of the contour itself as in experiment 1. For that experiment, the interpretation is
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unproblematic because we found no evidence of discrimination when inducers were masked.
However, if we had found above chance performance for masked stimuli, it would have been
impossible to conclude that this was not due to discrimination of the inducers. Pilot experiments
for experiment 2 suggested that with the long-lasting counter-phase flicker masking, participants
might in occasional trials have had some residual awareness of the corners in the inducers. Thus
they might still have performed above chance at a shape/orientation discrimination on the pur-
ported illusory contour even though they did not in fact perceive any illusory contour. This prob-
lem also plagues many previous experiments that directly tested the presence of an illusory shape
[36,37]. Therefore, only a task that exploits the presence of the illusory contour to modulate per-
formance on an orthogonal task, like the dot localization task we used, can provide conclusive
evidence that an illusory contour was in fact perceived. An alternative possibility could be a task
that relies on a fine discrimination of a feature of the illusory contour such as its curvature [38]
but even such discriminations may be confounded with discrimination of the inducers [46,47].
In all tests of performance against chance levels we used Bayesian hypothesis tests that can
quantify the strength of evidence for the null hypothesis indicating that participants were
guessing [44]. None of these tests revealed strong evidence for the null hypothesis as typical
Bayes Factors fell between 0.3–0.5. To establish more compelling support for the null hypothe-
sis in those cases much larger samples would be required. Crucially, the Bayes Factor indicates
by how much the observed evidence should update one’s prior belief in the null or alternative
hypothesis. Even if the evidence is relatively weak, any Bayes Factor below 1 is evidence in
favor of the null and not for the alternative hypothesis. Unless one starts with a prior belief that
people are clearly able to discriminate masked stimuli, even these modest Bayes Factors suggest
that participants were probably guessing.
Several previous studies used stimulus manipulations that seek to disentangle the factors
associated with Kanizsa-type illusory contours [39,48,49]. Rounding the corners of the Pacman
inducers results in a notable reduction in the illusory contour percept and abolishes the concor-
dant improvement on a spatial localization task. However, stimuli like this nonetheless acti-
vated higher extrastriate cortex to a similar degree as Kanizsa stimuli [39]. This is consistent
with the theory that later stages of visual processing, presumably mediated by higher visual
areas, segment surfaces and assign boundaries to objects. These segmentations are then fed
back to early visual cortex to generate signals that are interpreted as illusory contours [48].
Practical support for this idea comes from transcranial magnetic stimulation experiments that
disrupted neural processing either in object-sensitive lateral occipital (LO) cortex or in early
visual areas V1 and V2 [50]. Critically, the disruption of LO cortex only abolished the illusory
contour percept early after stimulus onset while disruption of early visual areas only did so at a
later stage–presumably affecting feed-back signals rather than the early feed-forward response.
Additional stimulus processing that is unrelated to the actual formation of illusory contours
could also explain previous reports that Kanizsa stimuli are faster to break through CFS mask-
ing than control stimuli [35]. The collinearity of edges and the thereby inferred surface may be
processed even while the stimulus is suppressed from awareness–this may in turn produce an
attentional signal that causes the stimulus to break suppression. Recent experiments that tested
a range of visual control stimuli under CFS suggest that low-level properties of the stimulus
determine the time it takes to break suppression [51]. Such stimulus-dependent effects are also
plausible because attentional processing can occur without awareness of the stimulus [52–54].
However, this does not prove that any percept of an illusory contour was actually formed. This
process may also explain why crowding interferes with discrimination of the inducer orienta-
tion but not with illusory contour formation [55].
While we did not manipulate the presence of illusory contours in this way in our experi-
ments, we nonetheless controlled this factor by including real luminance contour conditions.
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In experiment 2 the presence of a contour should afford an improvement on an orthogonal
spatial localization task. Such an improvement in localization thresholds only occurred for the
real luminance contour or when Kanizsa inducers were visible. Improvements like this are not
observed for stimuli that match the global characteristics but which do not produce illusory
contours [39]. Therefore our results from this experiment strongly support the conclusion that
illusory contours were simply not formed when inducers were masked.
Our results also agree with previous findings that only local processing occurs in the absence
of awareness but that more complex analysis of scene geometry requires conscious processing
[21]. This would also explain why the nature of stimulus representations in higher visual areas
differs depending on awareness.
However, our findings do not accord with a number of other studies that suggest that illu-
sory contours are processed unconsciously. Experiments on a patient with extinction due to a
parietal lesion suggest that perception of a Kanizsa shape occurs even when some inducers are
placed into parts of the visual field where the patient’s conscious perception is impaired [26–
29]. These findings indicate that visual processing operates at the surface- or object-based level.
Segmenting and grouping the local features of an image into a coherent, global shape may only
require awareness of some component features but it then spreads to the whole object. How-
ever, this is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate that these processes would occur when the
participant is unaware of all components. More importantly, it also does not demonstrate that
the percept of illusory contours was actually formed under these conditions but only that some
processing of the features producing illusory contours under normal viewing conditions still
occurred.
Another study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and an inattentional
blindness paradigm to study illusory contours processing [49]. Participants were presented
with a sequence of images, some of which contained Kanizsa shapes whilst others were various
types of control stimuli. Simultaneously, participants were engaged in a demanding attentional
task at fixation. A sub-group of participants subsequently reported not to have seen any
Kanizsa stimuli. These participants nonetheless showed stronger fMRI responses to Kanizsa
than control stimuli. Multivariate classification methods further demonstrated that the activa-
tion patterns produced by unseen Kanizsa stimuli were more reliable than those produced by
control stimuli. The authors suggested that the neural signature of illusory contours differs
from that of other, carefully matched stimuli and thus argued that illusory contours are pro-
cessed even without awareness of the stimuli.
This finding is interesting because it tests the consequences of awareness without any exper-
imental manipulation of the stimuli. The distinction of what is or is not processed without
awareness only depends on the contents of the participant’s consciousness. However, this also
makes it difficult to interpret these results. First, it is unclear whether participants apparently
oblivious to the presence of the stimuli really did not perceive any illusory shapes. Due to the
design of the experiment, awareness could only be assessed after the main fMRI experiment
rather than on a trial-by-trial basis (but see above our discussion why such trial-by-trial judg-
ments of awareness are complicated). Only participants who reported having seen the actual
Kanizsa stimulus during the experiment were classified as having had awareness of the stimuli.
However, many of the candidate stimuli were similar Kanizsa shapes. Therefore it is possible
that participants had some awareness of the stimuli, even if an imprecise one.
Second, while the control stimuli in the main fMRI experiment were very carefully matched
to rule out the influence of global characteristics this can by definition only be an approxima-
tion: if conditions were perfectly matched, the stimulus would be identical and thus an illusory
contour would be perceived. It is possible that the conditions resulting in an illusory contour
percept are also particularly effective in producing discriminable activation patterns in visual
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cortex. For instance, the contrast energy along the mouths of the Pacmen inducers differed
considerably between the Kanizsa and the global control stimuli. Thus, surface segmentation
or collinear interactions may have also differed between these conditions.
All these issues again highlight an important point: The only way one can truly infer that
illusory contours are formed is by using a measure that is specific to the presence of an illusory
contour. This is indeed what we did in our previous CFS experiment [22], our present experi-
ment 1, or what was done in several other previous experiments [23,34,50,55], by asking partic-
ipants to directly report a feature of the contour. Another useful manipulation is the spatial
localization task used by other studies [23,39] as well as our experiment 2. This is because the
performance enhancement only occurs in the presence of an actual contour helping the partici-
pant to localize the target. Many previous studies suggesting that illusory contours are pro-
cessed without awareness of the inducers are confronted with this problem. In S1 Appendix we
included another experiment in which we tested whether Kanizsa shapes masked from aware-
ness could nevertheless provide an attentional cue for a subsequent visual search task. Even if a
robust priming effect were found in such an experiment, this design simply cannot rule out
alternative explanations. It only tests the consequences of the stimuli that may in fact not be
specific to illusory contours.
In the same vein, neurophysiological and neuroimaging experiments have shown that illu-
sory contours are encoded by neurons even in the early visual cortex [25,33,56–67]. The over-
whelming majority of these experiments were conducted on awake participants. However,
some neurophysiological studies reported neuronal tuning to illusory contours even in anes-
thetized animals [25,58,67]. Such findings seem to superficially contradict our conclusion that
awareness of the inducing stimuli is necessary for the formation of illusory contours. However,
these experiments are in fact a perfect illustration of the importance to distinguish between
perceptual experience and correlated processing. Because animals are anesthetized in these
experiments and thus by definition unaware of the stimuli, it is impossible to determine
whether illusory contours were formed. The neural correlates of these stimuli could be related
to the contextual processing of the inducing stimuli, such as the discontinuities detected by
“end-stopped cells” or the detection of collinearity in the image. Such processing may indeed
occur in the absence of awareness as is supported by our finding of collinear priming [21] and
the induction of contextual visual illusions under masking conditions [2,3] or inattention [6].
Furthermore, it is quite likely that such stimulus processing is a necessary prerequisite for the
formation of illusory contours. However, they do not conclusively prove that illusory contours
are formed under anesthesia.
A related issue is that all of these studies use illusory contours induced by abutting lines (off-
set gratings) rather than Kanizsa shapes. While the two share a similar phenomenology, con-
tours induced by abutting lines are arguably simpler and may be based mostly on local
processing while Kanizsa shapes are likely to involve more complex inferences of surface depth
and boundary ownership. Our experiments did not explicitly test illusory contours generated
with abutting lines and therefore do not speak to the question whether such simpler illusory
contours are in fact perceived when the inducers are masked.
We conclude that there is little evidence that Kanizsa-type illusory contours are processed
when participants are not aware of the inducing context. This appears to be the case for a range
of different methods to render the inducers invisible. However, all of these experiments
employed physical stimulus manipulations, while it is likely that an experimental design that
allows the use of the participant’s own report to determine awareness on a trial-by-trial basis
whilst also testing directly whether an illusory contour was in fact formed can answer this ques-
tion conclusively.
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Supporting Information
S1 Appendix. Description of an experiment testing whether priming by a Kanizsa triangle
enhances performance on a subsequent visual search task. The priming experiment is an
indirect test of unconscious processing of illusory contours. This serves as an illustration that
such indirect tests cannot provide conclusive evidence for or against unconscious processing.
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